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LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS. By Harry H. Wellington. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. xi, 409.
While there is some temptation to view the collective bargaining
process in terms of common law concepts of freedom of contract,
the analogy is quite unsound. The economic basis of the differences
to be resolved in the labor area simply do not fit the assumptions
of commercial freedom. Not only is there a diametric disparity in
the parties' perception of the benefit of such a contract, but also the
contracting parties may be effectively monopolistic in their
respective offerings. Thus, a discussion of freedom of contract in
labor relations can be largely diversionary, involving extended
analysis as to why either public policy or economic reality dictates
that each party not be left totally to its own devices.
Professor Wellington avoids the attraction of the traditional
concept and chooses to speak of "freedom of collective contract,"'
a term to which the limitations necessitated by industrial relations
can be readily applied. In this posture, the author's discussion of the
legislatively imposed duty to bargain need not be an apology for
abandonment of the principles of freedom of commercial association
revered in other contexts. Moreover, such purposeful labeling may
minimize reservations about the extent to which legal institutions
should define the subject matter of "free" labor negotiations. Such
desensitizing is necessary, of course, because our basic labor statute
in fact not only requires that management meet with labor's
representative but also gives labor the right to compel consideration
of particular topics. 2 Beyond this suggestive framework, national
policy supposes that the economic consequences of disagreement will
prod the parties to meaningful negotiations and, generally,
agreement.
It is true that the natural impetus for negotiation is strong, and
1H. WELLINGTON. LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 52 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
WELLINGTON].
2See Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964): "[It is] the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. .. ."
1313
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
that for the most part the desired result-peaceful dispute
settlement-has been achieved. But the satisfaction of seeing the
system work reasonably well has produced the corollary that the
interchange between labor and management must be left undisturbed
by governmental meddling. Particularly sacrosanct is the parties'
complete control of the formulation and promotion of their
respective demands. In his early pages, Professor Wellington
endorses this viewpoint. In general laudation of the fact that legal
institutions have not required the parties to make objectively
reasonable proposals, he questions "whether one can assert with
assurance that substantial progress toward agreement without
warfare will be made by requiring employers and labor organizations
to behave toward one another in a fashion deemed reasonable by the
government." 3 In the same spirit, he accepts' the Supreme Court's
pronouncements that ours is a system in which "the Government
does not attempt to control the results of negotiations"' and that
"the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, . . . sit in
judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements." 6
But as the remainder of the book concedes, our legal institutions,
despite this rhetoric, have interjected themselves directly into the
political and economic relationships of union and management.
While our ideal may continue to be non-interference, the recent
history of labor relations underscores our learning that public policy
at times commands that the substantive terms of agreements be
judged and that the results of negotiations be controlled. Despite the,
initial tribute to traditional views, this book distinguishes itself in the
sensitivity with which its major chapters examine the critical tension
between labor-management freedom and the need for satisfaction of
otherwise unrepresented employee or public interests.
The range of instances in which practice has outstripped the ideal
includes such varied intrusions as the statutory prohibition upon
"hot cargo" agreements7 and administrative disapproval of benefit
differentials based solely on sex.8 Among the most potent of external
'WELLINGTON at 57.
11d. at 58.
5NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,488 (1960).
'NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
'Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. 158(e) (1964).
'Decision of EEOC, Case No. YNY9-034, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 8105
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standards has been the duty of fair representation. In the past, it has
been used extensively to attack racial discrimination. Its application
in this area has justified the nullification of contract provisions
which expressly prohibited employment of black workers in
particular capacities,9 restricted the percentage of blacks employed
in certain job classifications, 0 and effectuated a work distribution
system which was racially-based." But it is with relation to more
subtle forms of economic discrimination that the duty of fair
representation could serve its most pervasive role in legitimatizing
judicial and administrative scrutiny of the substantive terms of
collective bargaining agreements. And it is at this level that the
question of institutional nonintervention becomes a significant issue.
Were present concepts refined, the labor representative approaching
the bargaining table would not have unlimited discretion to allocate
its bargaining energy among the range of interests it represents. As
a check against abuse, each employee would be given the right to
question whether he has received his share of the negotiated benefits.
Yet, beyond broad principles framed to favor wide discretion in the
bargaining representative, the standards for judging jbenefit
allocation are not apparent.
In his discussion of standards, Professor Wellington notes the
statement of the Supreme Court that the duty of fair representation
imposes upon a labor representative a duty analogous to that
imposed upon a state legislature under the equal protection clause.' 2
But the absence of democratic institutions in the labor constituency
leaves the analogy quite vulnerable to the author's criticism that
collective decisions are not deserving of the same judicial respect as
decisions of state legislatures. 3 Even the more recent pronouncement
of the Court limiting the union's representational discretion to
exercises undertaken in "good faith and [with] honesty of purpose"
(1969); Decision of EEOC. Case No. 68-9-183E, id.; 8053 (1969). The General Counsel
of the EEOC early rejected the argument that a discriminatory benefit plan included in a
collective bargaining agreement is immune from Title VII prohibitions. Opinion Letter, EEOC
General Counsel, August 30, 1966, LAT. REL REP., LRX 2122-23 (1969).
'Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
"Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
"Local 1367, Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enfd. 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1966). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).





has not supplied a satisfactory basis for review." For Professor
Wellington, these are decisions in the institutional perspective,
responsive to the limitations of the judiciary's capacity to serve as
a forum for calling the representative to the defense of his bargain.
Unfortunately he leaves his analysis at that point: the suggested
standards are inappropriate, but judicial review may be
unsatisfactory in any case. In the absence of guidelines more precise
than those suggested by the Court thus far, distribution of economic
benefits will be largely left to internal union decision-making. The
element which compels rejection of the analogy between the duty of
equal protection-an absence of democratic institutions within the
union-also makes it doubtful that the decisions reached internally
will be fair to all segments of the membership group. Our experience
with racial discrimination in union representation underscores the
danger. As long as the force of federal policy preserves not only
exclusivity of representation but also the union's authority to exact
financial support from every member, we should be disturbed by this
implication.
Current precedents may not, however, be determinative of future
developments with respect to economic discrimination, for they have
been produced in cases which do not confront the particular issues
which might be raised when, for example, an employee alleges that
his union has not expended equal effort in negotiating a benefit
package for his job classification. This sort of case does not offer
the compelling policy choices which have characterized fair
representation decisions to date, particularly those involving racial
discrimination, and should necessitate a rethinking of the sincerity
of judicial homage to a broadly-framed duty of fair representation.
There is one respect in which our legal institutions might seem
to give full effect to a policy of non-intervention in the collective
bargaining process: the parties can presumably choose not to
bargain at all about a particular matter. Thus, where neither labor
nor management perceives any advantage in securing concessions
from the other on a subject, a governmental entity will not demand
consideration of it. But this does not mean that the matter is
immune from the legal process. Indeed, whatever commitment there
is to governmental non-intervention in collective bargaining may be
illusory in terms of the result ultimately effected. Employers and
"Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
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labor in the construction industry, for example, have chosen not to
bargain meaningfully about increasing the employment opportunities
for members of minority groups. National policy cannot accept that
decision and requires, at least for those projects involving federal
expenditures, that unilateral efforts be undertaken by the government
to effectuate reversal of prior employment practices. The
institutional response in this instance was the Philadelphia Plan,
under which specific numerical commitments to minority manpower
utilization are made a condition of bidding for federally funded
construction projects. 15 Thus by executive declaration, the admission
and referral policies of unions, and the employment futures of
existing members, have been radically adjusted to satisfy national
policy. It is not supposed that labor or management had sufficient
interest eventually to initiate a satisfactory program for achieving
increased employment opportunities for minorities. But the lesson is
clear. When a superior national labor policy requires
implementation, we are equipped, both institutionally and
philosophically, to abandon the assumptions upon which traditional
notions of free collective bargaining are based. In this context, the
principle of non-intervention must be restated to recognize that the
freely-bargained result is exalted only to the extent it does not
impinge the creditability of the legal process. Beyond that, continued
institutional perpetuation of the principle cannot be justified.
Professor Wellington c9nfronts this limitation inherent in
permitting self-selection of bargaining topics. While the issue he
selects is wage-price guidelines as a control of inflation rather than
minority employment opportunities in the construction industry, the
proffered analysis has broad implications. He suggests methods for
satisfying national policy without resort to the type of unilateral
governmental action undertaken in the Philadelphia Plan. The
alternative most persuasively pursued is that of integrating guidelines
such as those of the Council of Economic Advisers'6 with the
statutory duty to .bargain. Not only would the parties have a general
duty to bargain in good faith, but they could be made to discuss in
good faith their respective positions with regard to the several
flexible guidelines proposed by the Council. 1 The author
"See CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 16,176 (1969). See also id. 8069, 8104.
"ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvisERS (1962).
'
7 WELUNGTON at 324.
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appropriately does not require compliance with these standards.
Provision for judicially enforced conformance would undercut the
impetus for negotiation since the bargain struck might not be that
to which the parties are ultimately required to adhere. Anticipating
that a more forceful procedure may be required, the author examines
other, equally innovative approaches. 8
To the extent that the book presents a recurring statement of the
fundamental truths of labor in the legal process-and the diversity
of its coverage does not readily admit to a singular
categorization-its viewpoint is summarized in this discussion of
wage-price restraints. The author's preference is clearly for the
collectively bargained result. Dispute resolution by undisturbed
private negotiation, in his view, is most likely to satisfy the national
interest in. minimizing industrial warfare. Even when other national
interests are left unsatisfied in the substantive terms of the bargain
achieved, the reaction of our legal institutions should be guided by
respect for the bargaining process. In fashioning alternative means
of effectuating policy, that process should be abandoned only after
every means of incorporating it into the decision-making structure
has been explored. The hallmark of this philosophy is its patience
in deferring realization of national policy goals while alternatives
utilizing the bargaining process are field-tested. However, herein lies
its limitation. Resolution of some issues cannot await the finding of
a workable approach within the bargaining context. For other
questions, such as employment opportunities in the construction
industry, the hoped-for-result is unlikely to flow freely from private
negotiation by parties neither of whom has a significant interest in
providing broad solutions.
John C. Weistart*
nOne alternative envisages a federal committee, made up of representatives from labor,
management, and the public, whose purpose it would be to restate economic policy in terms
relevant to collective bargaining. Effectuating the policy formulated at the national level would
be commissions drawn along regional or industry lines and given authority to intervene in
those contract negotiations which have a significant impact on national economic conditions.
Also pursued is the possibility of adding some variation of the above to the range of
procedures which should be available to the President for dealing with major work stoppages.
WELLINGToN at 327-33.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University; B.A. 1965, Illinois Wesleyan University:
J.D. 1968. Duke University.
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